At this point, another exchange rate system in Japan played an irreplaceable role in the bursting of this bubble - the settlement and sale of foreign exchange system. The biggest feature of the settlement and sale of foreign exchange system is that the market has the right to sell off currencies it believes are overvalued to the central bank at the exchange rate revealed by the central bank. By the early 1990s, international hot money that had flowed into Japan due to the appreciation of the yen sold yen back to the Bank of Japan at a relatively high price set by the Japanese themselves, converting them into dollars with potentially higher value. As a result, almost all yen-denominated assets plummeted. By the mid-1980s, the US government, for political reasons, pressured Japan to appreciate the yen. Looking at the results later on, Japan's correct choice at that time should have been to gradually change its exchange rate system, loosen its peg to the dollar, and gradually allow the market to decide the exchange rate. However, what Japan did was to continue pegging to the dollar, only redefining the exchange rate. What Quantum Fund saw at that time was precisely the market "demand" for depreciation of the domestic currency in Southeast Asian countries. Afterwards, public opinion generally criticized Soros, believing that without him, that financial crisis would not have occurred. Rationally speaking, such criticism is baseless. Even without Soros, there would be others like A罗斯 or B罗斯 doing similar things, because this was not due to the speculative behavior of any individual, but rather the wrong exchange rate system gave certain people the opportunity to speculate. The consequence of this was: since Japan failed to implement a transformation of its economic model, the momentum for economic development under the high valuation of its own currency gradually disappeared, instead being maintained by an active monetary policy supporting excess capacity that was incompatible with China's "demand". In the end, the market did not feel that the yen was worth that much money, so they all sold off various assets that had appreciated due to the appreciation of their own currency, turning what was once a gold mountain into a bubble. Or we can say, setting aside political factors, the difference between the current real economy and the actual value of the Renminbi (RMB) is much smaller now than two years ago. If we firmly believe in the development model of market economics, whether we are willing to accept such realities or not, we must reform the exchange rate system. To take the economy to a higher level, we have no other choice. Today, in order to maintain economic growth momentum, we are also implementing a pegged plus settlement and sale of foreign exchange exchange rate system. Every time there is pressure for RMB appreciation, people often focus on whether to "appreciate" or "not appreciate", ignoring the important feeling of exchange rate system reform. Referring to the actual value of China's finance, the current value of the RMB may be underestimated, but how it should change cannot be reliably determined by some people's calculations. Exchange rate system reform is inevitable. At that time, whether it was Japan or Southeast Asian countries, if they could have changed their rigid exchange rate system earlier and let the market decide the exchange rate, would these disasters have still happened? Although history cannot be hypothetical, from a logical perspective, I still believe they wouldn't have happened, or at least not as severely. Similar to Japan, the economic revitalization of Southeast Asian countries in the 1980s was also driven by exports, and these countries implemented a pegged exchange rate system. By the mid-1990s, the rapid development of these countries fell into a bottleneck. Unlike Japan, due to the lack of new economic growth momentum, the actual value of the real economy in Southeast Asian countries did not support the stable and relatively high valuation of their domestic currencies. Objectively, these countries' domestic currencies needed to be devalued, but the rigid exchange rate system could not immediately meet the demands of the market. Soros took advantage of the situation, changing everything. One important reason why people are so sensitive to the appreciation of their own currency is that many financial crises have been related to changes in the value of their own currency. This cannot help but make people in our country associate: if the RMB appreciates, will it cause serious damage to our own finance, especially when the financial crisis has not yet completely ended? The most recent and profound lessons for us were the "Plaza Accord" which "forced" the appreciation of the yen and the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis. The former triggered Japan's "Lost Decade," while the latter wiped out the "Four Asian Financial Dragons." On the contrary, I think that the RMB facing appreciation pressure isn't something new, and calmly facing it will cause no harm. Moreover, whether or not to appreciate is not something those people can arbitrarily decide. Furthermore, this is not the crux of the matter. Even if the exchange rate issue is placed in a prominent position, the core issue is not the so-called "RMB appreciation issue," but rather the issue of exchange rate system reform. Of course, reforming the exchange rate system requires a turning point. What exactly constitutes a good turning point, I do not know. But I do know that in the pendulum experiment, the closer you release the pendulum to the equilibrium position, the smaller the amplitude of its swing and the more stable its movement. Although everyone now expects the RMB to appreciate, under the objective pressure of rising trade protectionism and the controversial Copenhagen carbon emissions framework, this expectation has been somewhat discounted. In fact, carefully reviewing the fundamental causes of the aforementioned two crises, changes in the value of one's own currency were not the root of the disaster, just the trigger. The direct cause lay in the exchange rate system. Taking Japan as an example, the great leap forward of Japan's economy in the late 1970s and 1980s fundamentally came from export-driven growth. Economies choosing this model almost always have a fixed exchange rate system model, which is pegging to the international dominant currency, artificially undervaluing their own currency, with the aim of minimizing imports, accumulating exports, and becoming trendsetters. From the perspective of urgency, the RMB exchange rate is really not the core of the current economic problems, nor even one of the most important issues. However, two events that occurred recently have once again drawn high attention to the RMB exchange rate: One is the large inflow of international hot money into Hong Kong's capital markets, with some saying it is due to expectations of RMB appreciation, thus triggering concerns about hot money entering mainland capital markets; Two is that European and American countries, including the USA, have once again brought up the "old topic," demanding RMB appreciation, with some worrying that this could further exacerbate the already impacted Chinese export industry. 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