Related thematic articles: Wuhan Yanda Great Cause Technology Development Co., Ltd. 4Hq Wuhan Yanda Great Cause Technology Development Co., Ltd. 6Kf Wuhan Yanda Great Cause Technology Development Co., Ltd., is a specialized institution engaged in the research and development of daily chemical products and cleaning supplies. It has a complete circulation and sales network system across the country. Its products are not only popular domestically but also exported to many countries and regions such as Africa, Europe, and South Asia.
Yanda Great Cause fully automatic detergent powder machine, cleaning supplies forming machine, adopts advanced gravity cone attachment formation, pneumatic inflation, emulsification formation, and computer self-control technology for one-time production of puffed, concentrated, enzyme-added, and scented laundry powders, hand washes, soaps, shampoos, and other series of cleaning supplies. The process is advanced, and the quality is excellent. Yanda Great Cause's super-ability goal is to develop top-tier equipment and processes, creating the first brand in the cleaning industry. The new generation of all-in-one small-scale cleaning supplies production equipment from Yanda Great Cause builds a bridge for customers who aspire to engage in the production of cleaning supplies on a smaller scale!
Pioneering investment in the cleaning market, achieving wealth dreams early in life!
Changing clothes and washing them is a cycle that continues throughout life. Detergent is a single-use consumable, a non-renewable resource with an inexhaustible large market. But how much do you really know about it? According to statistics, the world's average annual detergent consumption per person is 7.4 kilograms, while China, with a population of 1.3 billion, consumes only 3 kilograms. The obvious consumption gap shows the enormous development potential of China's cleaning supplies market! In 2008, China's detergent sales reached 4 million tons. Including fabric softeners and disinfectants, the entire detergent market was worth 50 billion yuan. It is estimated that the market sales in 2009 could reach 80 billion yuan. Choosing Yanda Great Cause means a promising future!
The stain removal ability refers to the capacity of detergents to remove visible stains on clothes, such as oil spots, bloodstains, sweat stains, food stains, and dirt on collars and cuffs. Whiteness preservation ensures that washed clothes remain bright and fresh without becoming gray or dull. A good detergent should perform well in both aspects, which is determined by its components.
**Selection Tips**
Choose reputable brands produced by legitimate manufacturers sold through normal distribution channels to avoid counterfeit or inferior products.
Check the appearance: Packaging should be intact, sealed tightly without leaks, powder should be white (colored powders should be uniform, but it is recommended to buy white powder), and when flipping the detergent bag, the product inside should flow freely without clumping.
Read the instructions carefully and don't easily believe vague claims like "magic particles" or "stain removers." Pay attention to specific ingredients, especially performance-enhancing ones like biological enzyme agents and bleaching agents, as these often determine the quality differences between detergents.
Wuhan Yanda Great Cause Technology Development Co., Ltd.
Address: No. 446 Luoyu Road, Hongshan District, Wuhan
Postal Code: 430070 E-mail: [email protected]
Consultation Hotline: 027-51856789 (multi-line)
027-50732251 027-50732252 027-50732253 027-50732256 027-50732257 027-50732258 027-50732259
Fax: 027-87506809
Transportation tips: Take bus 518 from Wuchang Railway Station or bus 536 from Hankou Railway Station, get off at Majiavillage station, walk back 100 meters.
Wuhan Yanda Great Cause Wilibai
Shen Wei Feng, Economic Observer: When you decided to start dangdang.com in 1999, it was during the internet boom. Was it easy to secure investments then? Was that your first time raising funds?
Li Guoqing: No, when I was doing Kewen Economic Trade, Americans invested in me, though not much, only 1 million USD. We were waiting for China’s internet users to reach 10 million before starting dangdang.com. Later, investors kept urging us, saying time is money, and 8848 was already up and running, so we decided to proceed when the number of internet users reached 8 million. That was April 1999, and by July, we secured the investment of 6.8 million USD. This amount was substantial for me, but back then, people were raising 10 million to 20 million USD quite easily. You didn’t even need to go to the U.S.; investors were waiting in China with money in hand. If you had a returnee background, you were worth 1 million, and if you had Wall Street experience, another million was added, just like that.
At that time, some people were willing to give more, but we didn’t want to take it. First, we wanted to choose investors suitable for us. Second, we didn’t want our shares to be diluted; we wanted our founding shares to have a larger proportion. Moreover, Yu Yu said that 6.8 million USD was already a significant amount, and entrepreneurs in the U.S. often started with just 2 million USD.
Economic Observer: Looking back now, there wasn’t much difference between 8 million and 10 million internet users. At that time, the foundation for e-commerce was very weak.
Li Guoqing: Yes, at that time, people had just learned to read news online and send emails. There was still a long way to go before buying things online. After two years of operation, we realized and warned our investors that if they were eager to list and cash out, they should invest in portal sites first. However, at that time, portal sites hadn’t even found advertising revenue yet, and no one believed in them. Selling goods would be even later, requiring portal sites to make enough money from advertisements before people could accept online shopping, marking the beginning of the maturity of the e-commerce market. Therefore, in our first five years, we couldn’t burn money, even if the investors wanted us to. I couldn’t afford to waste it.
Economic Observer: How long did you plan to spend the first round of investment of 6.8 million USD?
Li Guoqing: Our business plan was to sustain operations for three years.
Economic Observer: Did you anticipate the internet winter of 2000?
Li Guoqing: Yes, initially, we built a luxury team, all senior talents poached from multinational companies. By the end of 2000, NASDAQ crashed, and everyone felt that the internet had no future; stock options were worthless paper. They came here accepting a 30% pay cut aiming for options and IPOs. Seeing no hope, they all returned to traditional multinational corporations. Yu Yu and I locked ourselves in a room, looking at each other, almost tearing up. The marketing director we poached from Microsoft sympathized with us, saying, "You guys are too pitiful, let me help you for another year," and he stayed an extra year.
Economic Observer: Losing the luxury team must have been quite passive.
Li Guoqing: Actually, it wasn’t. Without this luxury team, it gave me the chance to truly understand what online retailing is all about. In 2000, when we discussed key financial indicators, we couldn’t move forward. Amazon in the U.S. spent only 25 yuan to acquire a new customer, whereas we spent one or two hundred yuan, with the marketing department alone costing 50 yuan. Secondly, their new customers contributed 100 yuan at the end of the year, something we couldn’t achieve; their customer return rate reached 50%, ours was only 30%. When discussing these metrics with the luxury team, they were dumbfounded, thinking it impossible to achieve. If they couldn’t do it, they wouldn’t dare to try, which I thought indicated problems.
Besides, watching some websites recklessly burn investor money, I thought, "Let winter come sooner, and wash these people out."
Economic Observer: Apart from the departure of the team, the crisis didn’t seem to cause more difficulties for dangdang.com.
Li Guoqing: Not really. I always felt my performance was okay. The internet winter of that period was actually a capital winter but a consumer spring for us. Our sales doubled every year, how beautiful was that? What followed was controlling the growth rate, possibly being overly conservative. But by 2003, we survived through this development model, and our sales doubling wasn’t achieved by throwing money around.
Economic Observer: Looking at dangdang.com’s development trajectory over the past ten years, some say it was too slow, others say it profited too late. What’s your view?
Li Guoqing: When dangdang.com’s sales reached 100 million yuan in 2003, I told the board that I would make a profit. Once sales exceed 100 million, I will turn a profit. If you ask me to make a profit immediately, the growth rate can only reach 60%; if you allow me to lose 24% of sales, I can achieve 180% growth; if you let me lose 50%, spending one yuan to earn two, sales can grow by 400%; some companies made 30 million in sales but spent 60 million, isn’t that like standing on the street blowing money with a fan? One hundred yuan per bundle, whoever picks it up gets it. That’s not called business. I dared only lose 12%, never depleting the initial 6.8 million USD, using it until today, until we began making profits.
Economic Observer: Many companies expand through mergers and acquisitions, but dangdang.com seems cautious in this regard.
Li Guoqing: Yes, we’ve never done any acquisitions, unwilling to. First, we’re satisfied with this growth speed. Our corporate culture and management aren’t fully formed yet. If we acquire someone, delaying their development, what should we do? Second, buying anything requires haggling. If something is worth 50 million, to accelerate your own development, you find issues and say it’s only worth 20 million. I can’t do that, let others do it. My heart isn’t black enough, so I’ll exploit myself, and let investors exploit me. I accept it.
Economic Observer: Is this the psychological shadow left from the acquisition talks with Amazon?
Li Guoqing: No, Amazon recognized our value the most. They understood online retailing too well. Among strategic investors, their valuation of us was always the highest. We couldn’t agree on major directions. I proposed Amazon holding 30% to 49%, not absolute control, just the majority shareholder; secondly, we wanted independent listing and independent development, with Amazon not intervening too much. But they disagreed, saying money wasn’t an issue. If 150 million USD wasn’t enough, as long as we didn’t ask for a billion, 200 million or 300 million could be negotiated. But they had one principle: they must hold 70% of the shares. They said it’s fine to lose money in the Chinese market, losing more is okay, and minority shareholders shouldn’t worry, following their strategy.
Big companies have their reasons, but I definitely couldn’t accept this because they don’t understand the Chinese market or Chinese consumers. Following their strategy, how could we succeed?
Economic Observer: Amazon in China obviously struggles with cultural adaptation, but it seems dangdang.com is still following Amazon’s U.S. model, especially recently mentioning diversifying into general merchandise.
Li Guoqing: This is related to my dream. Since I started my business, I’ve wanted to create my own commercial empire. What defines a commercial empire? I have a simple standard: annual turnover exceeding 10 billion yuan. China’s book market is 30 billion yuan. Exceeding 10 billion, unimaginable, equivalent to monopolizing the entire channel. Therefore, diversifying into general merchandise is necessary, a natural choice.
Economic Observer: What is the current proportion of general merchandise versus books in dangdang.com’s sales?
Li Guoqing: 20% is general merchandise. Besides warehousing and delivering ourselves, we also have a mall model, recruiting tenants to enter. We manage sales and checkouts but don’t handle logistics; they ship directly from factories. This business grows rapidly. Currently, we're still in the cultivation stage. General merchandise operates at a loss within the budget, while books operate at a profit within the budget, so challenges remain significant.
Economic Observer: Which category do you think will bring profits first in general merchandise?
Li Guoqing: Definitely not home appliances, nor digital products.
Economic Observer: Why? Online malls selling 3C digital products like JD.com and Newegg are developing rapidly.
Li Guoqing: Because physical stores are too powerful, like Gome and Suning, along with countless shops scattered everywhere. The cost of selling home appliances online is too high, unable to gain a cost advantage, as manufacturers absolutely won’t offer prices cheaper than Gome, Suning, or Dazhong. Secondly, upstream suppliers are too dominant. Some upstream vendors even trick Gome, how could they offer you discounts? A few websites tried selling phones to us, reaching several hundred million in sales, but weren’t profitable. Selling phones is common everywhere; you need to be 50 to 100 yuan cheaper, ruining profitability as traditional stores earn only 50 to 100 yuan. So currently, we use the mall model for digital products, organizing merchants to sell.
Economic Observer: How do you see Taobao’s role in cultivating the e-commerce market? Will the Taobao Mall model impact traditional B2C businesses like yours?
Li Guoqing: They have made contributions in the past, burning money a hundred times more than me. Every year, I tell investors and the board that they are bold, burning money a hundred times more than me, but they are betting on something big. They indeed cultivated the e-commerce market, opened up the retail market, and are undoubtedly pioneers! Of course, I assume they don’t want to become martyrs. What’s next? Various niche markets have emerged. Their positioning is unclear to me.
Economic Observer: What do you mean by niche markets? Do you think e-commerce will develop towards more vertical and specialized directions?
Li Guoqing: What I do is different from Jack Ma. I manage by categories and operating methods, not simply by B2C or C2C. Jack Ma does B2B Alibaba, B2C Mall, and C2C, which is too loose. Now talking about B2C, C2C, someone even created a new term called B2B2C, meaningless.
Economic Observer: From your perspective, e-commerce is no longer a single industry but a vast field.
Li Guoqing: Online malls are a vast field, similar to the current wireless internet. No wireless internet company does everything possible. Maps are maps, positioning is positioning. Selling things online also varies by category, with some categories being particularly strong, like books, which we call the main category. Other online malls will form their own main categories. Our mall is entirely different from Taobao Mall. We help customers select trustworthy tenants, ensuring sufficient credibility and low prices. We are developing a wireless dangdang.com, where old customers can already shop via mobile dangdang.com.
Economic Observer: Do you think the cultivation phase of the e-commerce market is complete?
Li Guoqing: Abroad, they consider online transactions accounting for 4% of total retail as completion. In China, it's too little, less than 1%, but this is the overall figure. In certain professional fields, it's completed, such as books, where we already account for 15% of the book market share.