Revealing why the US bombed the Chinese embassy in 1999

On May 7, 1999, two U.S. Air Force B-2 bombers took off from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. After several aerial refuelings, they crossed the Atlantic and arrived over Belgrade, the capital of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, just before midnight. They launched five 2000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions at a building identified by U.S. government analysts.

The CIA had determined this target because it believed the building was selling advanced military technology to rogue states like Libya and Iraq, profiting to fund Serbian armed forces. However, it turned out that the building was actually the Chinese embassy, which had moved there in 1997. The precision-guided bombs, using the U.S. Global Positioning System, heavily damaged the southern part of the building, completely leveling the military attaché's office. Three young Chinese journalists were killed, and 20 Chinese citizens were injured.

This bombing incident sparked the largest street protests in China since 1989 and caused one of the most serious crises in contemporary Sino-U.S. relations.

Chinese Demands:

Apology, Explanation, Severe Punishment for the Perpetrators

On May 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry first formally reacted, calling the bombing incident a "barbaric act," and warning NATO to take full responsibility for its consequences. Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan summoned U.S. Ambassador to China James Sasser to deliver China's "strongest protest" against the U.S.'s "serious infringement on China's sovereignty." Due to demonstrators gathered outside the embassy, Sasser refused to leave the embassy.

On May 10, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent an official note to the U.S., demanding that "NATO led by the U.S.": (1) issue a public and formal apology; (2) conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation into the bombing incident; (3) quickly publish the investigation results; (4) severely punish the perpetrators. The note also strongly demanded that NATO immediately stop military actions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and resolve the Kosovo crisis politically.

In addition to WTO accession talks, the Chinese government suspended almost all bilateral exchanges with the U.S., canceled military exchanges, requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the bombing incident, and subsequently insisted that U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright or other senior officials come to China to report the investigation results.

China’s public support for the Serbian government of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic increased, and its policy toward Russia significantly changed. Immediately after the incident, Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin conducted a lengthy hour-long dialogue via the Beijing-Moscow hotline, significantly enhancing defense cooperation. Meanwhile, Jiang Zemin refused to answer calls from the White House.

American Apology Angers China

A mere 'sorry' and then walk away

Washington clearly underestimated the intensity of China's reaction to the bombing incident, focusing entirely on the developments of the Kosovo conflict. At the time, the highly secretive CIA was trying hard to distance itself from another embarrassment (its failure to predict India's nuclear weapons test in 1998); the military executing the bombing emphasized their combat mission; the Pentagon was reluctant to disclose more relevant information; diplomatic and military actions had already exhausted NATO leaders. What Washington's leadership least wanted to see at this moment was the Balkans military operation, already fraught with difficulties, suddenly acquiring a complex Chinese dimension.

The carefully arranged apology further angered the Chinese people.

After the bombing incident, Ambassador Sasser immediately contacted the Chinese Foreign Ministry, expressing condolences for the "terrible mistake" that caused casualties. However, Washington only issued a statement hours after the incident, claiming it was a targeting error and expressed "deep regret" for the casualties caused by the "mistaken bombing." President Clinton called the bombing incident an "unfortunate mistake" and expressed "sincere regret and condolences" to Chinese leaders and the people, but simultaneously pointed out that the root of the problem was Serbian President Milosevic's "ethnic cleansing" policy.

These statements enraged Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., Li Zhaoxing, who told PBS NewsHour's Jim Lehrer: "If you just say 'sorry' without taking any deep measures and then walk away, it will only increase the indignation of the Chinese people." Clearly, Washington needed to do much more to meet China's demands, including apologies, investigations, compensation, and punishment of those responsible.

Investigation Results:

Difficult Even for Americans to Understand

At this point, an inter-agency working group composed of officials from the White House, State Department, and Defense Department began regular consultations to provide policy recommendations to the National Security Council's main leadership members. One participant said: "I know this was purely an accident, an operational mistake, but understanding why it happened and then explaining it to the Chinese side is an entirely different matter. The entire incident is shrouded in mystery, leaving bureaucrats at a loss, truly a disaster."

In the evening of the 8th, Secretary of State Albright personally carried an apology letter to the Chinese Embassy in the U.S. Besides conveying deep regret for mistakenly bombing the Chinese embassy and the tragedy it caused, she also mentioned "we cannot stand idly by as Milosevic carries out his 'ethnic cleansing' policy," implying NATO must continue military actions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The letter also hoped that the Chinese government would strengthen security measures for U.S. diplomatic institutions in China.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government conducted a series of investigations into the CIA's operations and oversights, hoping to understand why such a significant error occurred in target designation. The entire investigation was led by Deputy Secretary of State John Hamre and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Ralston, with multiple layers of confidentiality. Although Dr. Hamre and CIA Director Tenet later listed the main reasons for the target designation errors, details and conclusions remain classified.

One official involved in the investigation described it this way: "There are two coexisting facts: on one hand, the U.S. has very good technology, such as stealth bombers, laser guidance systems, satellite positioning technology, and aerial refueling; but on the other hand, someone in the basement is reading the sports section of the newspaper, eating powdered sugar donuts, drinking large cups of Slurpee, and selecting a city he has never been to as a bombing target."

Such a situation is difficult even for Americans themselves to understand, let alone for the Chinese, making it even more inconceivable. Therefore, they easily linked this fact to conspiracy theories and firmly believed them.

Tang Jiaxuan Rejects U.S. Explanation:

Conclusion of Mistaken Bombing Hard to Accept